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NOTE
THE VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT OF
1982: WHO ARE THE VICTIMS OF WHICH
OFFENSES?
When government took over the prosecution of criminal offenses,
the victim of the crime became a forgotten entity in the criminal
justice system.' The victim's only function after reporting the crime
was to serve as a witness, and all too often the government ignored
the fact that the victim had suffered! In the past few decades, several
states have recognized the victim's needs with the passage of victim
restitution statutes.' Victim restitution statutes attempt to provide
for reimbursement of the victim through payments from the offender
for injury or loss resulting from the offense. Congress has responded
to the crime victim's needs by enacting the Victim and Witness Pro-
tection Act of 1982 (the VWPA).4 The VWPA requires the offender
in Title 18 crimes5 to pay restitution to the victim for property loss
1. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2515, 2516 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
2. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL
295, 297-99 (R. Barnett & J. Hagel eds. 1977).
3. See, e.g., ALA. CODE SS 15-18-65 to -78 (1982 & Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT.
S 12.55.045 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-603.C (Supp. 1984-1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
S 775.089 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. SS 17-14-1 to -16 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT.
S 706-605(1)(e) (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-5-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-5-3 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. SS 910.1-910.5 (West Supp.
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 431.200 (Baldwin 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, SS
1321-1330 (1983 & Supp. 1984-1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, S 640 (Supp. 1984); MISS.
CODE ANN. SS 99-37-1 to -23 (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. SS 546.630, .640 (Vernon 1949);
N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:44-2, 43-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 31-17-1
(1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-1343 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE S 12.1-32-02(1) (Supp. 1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. S 137.103, .106,
.109 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, S 1106 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS SS 12-19-32
to -34; S.C. CODE ANN. S 24-23-210 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
S5 23A-28-1 to -12 (1979 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-201 (Supp. 1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. S 9.94A.140 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE SS 61-11A-1 to -7 (1984). Victim
restitution programs are distinguished from-victim compensation programs in that com-
pensation programs depend on state or federal government payments to the victim.
For the purposes of this paper, the term "restitution" refers to payments directly
from the offender to the victim.
4. The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96
Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C. and FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)) [hereinafter cited as VWPA].
5. Examples of Title 18 crimes include embezzlement, murder, mail fraud,
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or personal injury.6 One purpose of the VWPA is to give more legal
protection to victims and witnesses of federal crimes.' Another pur-
pose of the VWPA is to serve as a model code for the states because
Congress realized that most serious crimes are within the jurisdic-
tion of state and local law enforcement agencies.'
Although the goals of the VWPA are laudable, a major problem
is the lack of specific definitions, which must be remedied before the
VWPA can function effectively.' The basic terms "victim" and "of-
fense" are not clearly defined in the VWPA itself, its legislative
history, I° or in the Justice Department Guidelines." Such terms are
vital to the VWPA's interpretation in that they determine who may
receive restitution and to what extent. The further importance of
clearly defining these terms is evident due to the fact that the VWPA
requires the judge to order restitution in every case involving Title
18 crimes, unless he states the reason for not doing so."2
This note will focus on the restitution sections of the VWPA
and examine the terms "victim" and "offense" in an attempt to pro-
vide working definitions for those terms. The first section of this note
burglary, kidnapping, bank robbery, interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, and
violations of civil rights. See Merritt, Corrections Law Developments: Restitution Under
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 44, 45 (1984); Krasno,
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982-Does it Promise More than it Can Deliver,
66 JUDICATURE 468 (1983).
6. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2515.
7. Id. at 9-10, reprinted ii 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2515-16.
8. Id.
9. At least two commentators agree that one of the major problems with
the restitution section of the VWPA is the lack of definitions. Krasno, supra note
5, at 469-71; Merritt, supra note 5, at 45. Merritt noted that another critical problem
of VWPA is that studies reveal that most offenders barely make enough money to
sustain themselves and their dependents, let alone make restitution payments even
in small amounts. Merritt, supra note 5, at 47. Krasno also lists problems, such as
the possibility of the offender filing for bankruptcy or requiring the offender's family
to make restitution payments for an offense they did not commit, that arise as a result
of the VWPA's imprecise language. She goes on to conclude that the problems involved
in implementing the statute are so great that the public benefits of the VWPA may
be diminished significantly. Krasno, supra note 5, at 469-71.
10. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1.
11. Justice Department Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (July 25, 1983) (codified
in 18 U.S.C. S 1512 note) [hereinafter cited as Justice Department Guidelines].
12. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(a)(1), (2) (1982). Section 3580(a) permits the judge when
ordering restitution to consider the financial needs of the offender and his dependents,
the earning ability of the offender, and the financial loss suffered by the victim as
a result of the offense.
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discusses the history and the purposes of victim restitution, the
emergence of the VWPA, and the outcome of recent constitutional
challenges to the VWPA. To be effective, restitution programs must
stress the correctional benefits to offenders as well as the more
obvious benefits to victims. The second section examines the term
"offense." The definition of "offense" is essential in determining the
amount of restitution and the recipients of restitution. "Offense" should
be restricted to the narrow definition of the Federal Probation Act,13
to the "offense of conviction" standard.14 If "offense" is more broadly
construed to include either the original offenses charged, offenses in-
cluded in the entire criminal transaction, or even offenses that are
not charged, the VWPA will fail for lack of due process."
The third section of the note concentrates on who or what may
be considered a "victim" for purposes of the VWPA. The victim's
family should be entitled to restitution when they have suffered a
loss as a result of the offender's actions, 6 but some state and federal
courts have disallowed restitution to anyone other than the direct vic-
tim. 7 Insurers and other organizations who reimburse the victim 8
should also be entitled to restitution, especially when the compensators
are legally obligated to reimburse the victim for his losses. 9 Other-
wise, the public actually pays the offender's debt through increased
insurance premiums or taxes. 0 Similarly, the government should be
entitled to restitution in some circumstances.1 Additionally, charities
should be the recipients of restitution in cases where there are no
13. Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3651 (1982).
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 236-240 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Clovis Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n., 540 F.2d
1389 (10th Cir. 1976) (restitution ordered to a charitable organization disallowed because
it was not the aggrieved party); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950)
(error to order restitution for counts for which defendant was indicted, but not con-
victed); Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 155, 438 A.2d 490 (1981) (the term "victim"
did not include third party payors such as private insurance companies); People v.
Grago, 24 Misc. 2d 739, 204 N.Y.S. 2d 774 (1960) (union, from which union officer ap-
propriated money, and not bank which improperly credited money to officer's account,
was the "aggrieved party" for restitution purposes); State v. Eilts, 23 Wash. App.
39, 596 P.2d 1050 (1979), affd 94 Wash. 2d 489, 617 P.2d 993 (1980) (restitution limited
to losses suffered by investors who were named in information).
18. Examples of others who reimburse the victim might be state agencies
through state compensation programs, private agencies set up to aid victims of crime,
family members, or friends.
19. See infra notes 205-213 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 213.
21. See infra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
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readily identifiable victims.' In sum, the vague definition of "victim"
in the VWPA should be construed broadly to include all entities that
suffer as a result of the offender's actions.
The final section of the note will propose clear definitions of the
terms "victim" and "offense" that will further the goals of the VWPA.
These definitions will provide relief to the broadest class of victims,
and at the same time, protect the due process rights of the offender.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF RESTITUTION AS A CRIMINAL
SANCTION
A. History
Restitution is not a new idea in the theories of criminal justice.
Studies of ancient civilizations reveal that restitution was used among
groups to punish a crime by a member of one group to avoid blood
feuds.' As primitive cultures became socially organized, private retalia-
tion was replaced with group vengeance, which in turn was replaced
by compensation systems called "composition."24 When communities
became more structured, certain types of anti-social behavior were
sanctioned, and specific monetary amounts were set for repaying a
victim of those behaviors for his loss.2 As centralized leadership
became stronger, the leaders of the community took over the negotia-
tion process between the parties and demanded a portion of the com-
pensation for their services.' Eventually, the central authorities com-
pletely dominated the criminal justice process and collected all of the
payment as a fine.27 At that point, the victim's only hope to recover
damages was through the civil law of torts.28 The offender no longer
reimbursed the victim as a criminal sanction.
Restitution did not reappear in the criminal context until the
late nineteenth century, when it could only be ordered as a condition
of probation, and not in conjunction with a prison sentence.' In the
22. See infra notes 220-226 and accompanying text.
23. Nader & Combs-Schilling, Restitution in Cross Cultural Perspective, in
RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27, 28 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977).
24. Jacobs, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview, in RESTITUTION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 45 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977).
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id. at 47.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 49-50. Conferences were held in Stockholm in 1878, in Rome in 1885,
and in Brussels in 1900, all of which recommended the return to the use of restitution.
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1950's the English Parliament renewed consideration of restitution as
a means to make the victim whole.' However, the Parliament decided
that the difficulties with victim restitution, such as the offender's in-
ability to pay, were too great." Instead, the Parliament turned their
efforts toward victim compensation programs.32 Several states in the
United States followed the lead of the English by enacting victim com-
pensation statutes in the 1960's." However, many commentators con-
tinued to write on the benefits of restitution as a criminal sanction
and to encourage its adoption.' Today, several states combine both
victim compensation programs and victim restitution programs as a
method to indemnify the victim and to make the offender recognize
his responsibility.
The federal government has allowed restitution as a sentencing
option under the Federal Probation Act since 1925.36 Under the Pro-
bation Act restitution may only be ordered as a condition of proba-
tion; there is no option to order restitution independently or in con-
junction with a prison sentence.3" One advantage of the Probation Act
is its very specific language concerning restitution. The offender may
be ordered to "make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties
for actual loss or damage caused by the offense for which conviction
was had."3 In addition to limiting restitution to probation, another
Because the 1900 conference members could not agree on any specific restitution pro-
posals, they merely readopted a resolution which encouraged the victims of crime to
seek civil remedies. Id. at 49.
30. This change in attitude is largely credited to the works of Margery Fry,
an Englishwoman who wrote extensively on restitution in 1951 and again in 1957. M.
FRY, ARMS OF THE LAW (V. Gollancz ed. 1951); Fry, Justice /br Victims, The Observer
(London), July 7, 1957. Jacobs, supra note 24, at 51.
31. The major problem with restitution programs was the offender's inability
to pay. One of the reasons the offender lacked resources was that prison wages were
too low and that prisons could not offer better wages because of the inability to com-
pete in the private market with goods produced by prisoners. Jacobs, supra note 24,
at 50.
32. "Compensation" means payments administered to a victim through a state
administered program while "restitution" refers only to payments made by the of-
fender to the victim. Ms. Fry felt that society owed compensation programs to vic-
tims of crime as a matter of social welfare policy. Id. at 51.
33. Id. at 53.
34. Jacobs mentions the works of K. SMITH, A CURE FOR CRIME (1965); Eglash,
Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for Arson Rehabilitation Programs, 20 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF CORRECTIONS 20-34 (Nov.-Dec. 1958); and S. SCHAFER, THE VICTIM AND HIS
CRIMINAL 82-83 (1968). Jacobs, supra note 24, at 53-55.
35. See supra note 2.
36. Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3651 (1982).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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major drawback of the Probation Act is that restitution orders are
not mandatory.39 Congress finally reacted to the perceived need for
mandatory restitution orders with the VWPA in 1982.41
B. The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
The restitution sections of the VWPA allow the judge to con-
sider the needs of the victim in the sentencing process. The legislative
history of the VWPA indicates that equity requires that the victim
have some role or rights in the criminal justice process in light of
the offender's cautiously guarded rights. 1 At first glance, the prin-
ciple of restitution does not seem feasible because one would think
that the criminal offender is simply without the resources to pay his
victim. Nevertheless, advocates of restitution have shown that the
average dollar losses suffered are in the hundreds of dollars, not
thousands of dollars. 2 The lower dollar amounts will more likely be
within the means of the criminal offender. The VWPA, by requiring
a "victim impact statement, 43 informs the authorities of the victim's
losses and encourages the inclusion of restitution orders in sentenc-
ing."' Restitution orders are a method of restoring the victim to his
original status to the extent of the offender's ability to pay.
39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 US. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2536.
40. 18 U.S.C. SS 3579, 3580 (1982). The VWPA was introduced in response
to "Crime Victim's Week," which was declared by President Reagan in April of 1982.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2516.
41. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 US. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2516.
42. Id. at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2536.
43. Pub. L. No. 97-291, S 3(a), 96 Stat. 1238 (1982) amends FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(c)(2) to provide:
The presentence report shall contain: any prior criminal record of
the defendant; a statement of the circumstances of the commission of the
offense and circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior; information
concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological, and physical
harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the offense; and any other
information that may aid the court in sentencing, including the restitu-
tion needs of any victim of the offense.
In October, 1984, this rule was amended to include even more detailed information
about the defendant, his circumstances, and his resources. The amendment takes effect
on November 1, 1986. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
Title II, SS 215(a), 235, 98 Stat. 2014, 2031 (1984).
44. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 US. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 2537.
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Sentencing judges can use the VWPA to order a convicted of-
fender to pay restitution in lieu of or in addition to any other penal-
ty.'5 Restitution may be ordered for damage, loss, or destruction of
property of the victim and/or necessary medical and related expenses
for bodily injury of the victim, including lost income." If the offense
results in the victim's death, the offender may be ordered to pay the
cost of the funeral expenses and additional restitution may be paid
to the victim's estate." However, restitution may be ordered only if
"imposition of such order will not unduly complicate or prolong the
sentencing process.""8 Congress added this proviso recognizing that
although victimization may have lifelong cost implications, it may be
necessary to limit the amount of restitution." The various restitution
options offer flexibility to the judge and allow him to take into con-
sideration the circumstances of each case.
Once the restitution order has been made, the VWPA provides
some remedies for noncompliance with the order. If the offender is
placed on probation or parole and he fails to comply with the condi-
tion of restitution, then his parole or probation may be revoked.-'
However, the court or the Parole Commission should consider the of-
fender's present ability to pay when deciding whether to revoke parole
or probation.' The restitution order itself may also be enforced by
the United States or the victim in the same manner as a civil judg-
45. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(a) (1982). However, the sentencing judge must take into
consideration such factors as the offender's ability to pay and his financial resources
before ordering restitution. Id. S 3580(a).
46. Id. S 3579(b)(1), (2).
47. Id. S 3579(b)(3), (c). Restitution may be made in services to the victim or
to any organization or individual the victim designates, if the victim (or his estate)
consents. Id. S 3579(b)(4).
48. Id. S 3579(d).
49. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 31-32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2537-38. The amount of restitution may be limited because of the of-
fender's inability to pay. If the restitution order is beyond the offender's means, the
order may have a negative impact on the offender. An additional reason for limiting
the amount of restitution is that it may be too difficult to establish causation between
the offense and the harm which might unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing
process.
50. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(g) (1982).
51. Id. The circumstances the court or Parole Commission must consider are
"the defendant's employment status, earning ability, financial resources, the willfulness
of the defendant's failure to pay, and any other special circumstances tht have a
bearing on the defendant's ability to pay." Id. In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660
(1983), the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment forbids a state from
revoking an indigent's probation for failure to pay a fine and make restitution in absence
of a determination that he had not made bona fide efforts to pay or that there were
1985]
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ment.52 Thus, the offender may not ignore the restitution order because
of the enforcement mechanisms of the VWPA.
The VWPA also provides limitations on the time in which restitu-
tion is to be paid-, on the payment of restitution to others who com-
pensate the victim, and on the total amount of damages the victim
may receive from the offender. If no specific time period for payments
is set by the court, restitution must be made immediately.5 3 Other-
wise, the court may order the offender to make all payments by the
end of his probation term, five years after release from prison, or
five years from the date of sentencing.' Furthermore, when the vic-
tim has been or will be compensated by someone other then the of-
fender 5 the court might not order the offender to make restitution
to the victim at all.' Instead, the offender may be ordered to make
restitution to the one who compensated the victim, provided the of-
fender's resources prove sufficient. 7 The VWPA mandates that the
court's priority be that all the victims receive restitution before pay-
ment will be ordered to anyone who has suffered a loss indirectly."
The VWPA also limits the total amount of damages the victim may
receive from the offender.59 If the victim decides to sue the offender
in a civil proceeding, any restitution received under the VWPA will
be set off against any amount the victim may be awarded in the civil
action." This practice prevents the victim from receiving double
damages." These limitations offer some protections to ensure that vic-
alternative forms of punishment. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-69. In other words, the
Supreme Court held that the considerations mentioned in S 3579(g) are essential con-
siderations for the court before parole or probation may be revoked.
52. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(h) (1982). To enforce a civil judgment, the victim or the
United States must go to the home state and/or county of the offender and sue for
a lien on the offender's property. The exact method of this procedure depends on
the laws of the particular state. Under civil law, the debtor has certain exemptions,
such as homestead and life insurance exemptions, which may not be attached by the
creditor. It is unclear whether these exemptions would apply to enforcement of a restitu-
tion order under S 3579(h). See also Krasno, supra note 5, at 471.
53. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(f)(3) (1982).
54. Id. S 3579(f)(2).
55. See supra note 18 for examples of others who might compensate the victim.
56. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(e)(1) (1982).
57. Id. Although it would seem that the victim's rights should be subrogated
by the compensator, S 3579(e)(1) makes it clear that all of the victims will be reimbursed
first. The compensator will only receive restitution if the offender has adequate
resources to reimburse everyone.
58. Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(e)(2) (1982).
60. Id.
61. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2538.
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tims receive the benefits of the VWPA and at the same time prevent
the victim from abusing those benefits.
Courts have considerable flexibility in determining the needs of
the offender as well as the needs of the victim when making a restitu-
tion order." Section 3580 allows the court to consider the loss suf-
fered by the victim, the financial resources, needs, and earning abili-
ty of the offender and his dependents, as well as any other factors
the court deems appropriate.63 The court is also given broad discre-
tion in settling any disputes that may arise over the amount of restitu-
tion. 4 The result of such broad discretion is that in most cases, the
victim's needs are given priority over the offender's needs. 5 Thus,
although the VWPA appears to balance the needs of all parties in-
volved, the factors considered might not be given equal weight.
Furt-her assistance in exercising their discretion under the VWPA
is given judges by the Justice Department Guidelines. The VWPA
requires the Attorney General of the United States to issue guidelines
for the implementation of the VWPA in the federal court system.6
The Justice Department Guidelines respond to the perceived need for
fair and sympathetic treatment of victims and witnesses of federal
crimes.6" Little attention is paid to the restitution sections of the
VWPA, although the background statement indicates a desire to assist
victims in recovering their losses.66
62. 18 U.S.C. S 3580 (1982). This section outlines the procedure for issuing
restitution orders.
63. Id. S 3580(a).
64. Id. S 3580(d). Most disputes over the amount of restitution arise when
the offender challenges the restitution order as being too high. One case in point is
Richard v. United States, 738 F.2d 1120 (1984). See infra note 236.
65. Apparently, the court must at least consider the offender's resources. See
United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 515 (6th Cir. 1985). However, even a finding
of the offender's indigency may not bar a restitution order. See, e.g., United States
v. Fountain, No. 84-1939 (7th Cir. July 8, 1985) (available Oct. 1, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Cir file) (indigency is not a defense to a restitution order); United States v.
Keith, 754 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1985) (The VWPA does not prohibit imposing a restitu-
tion order on one who is indigent at the time of sentencing); United States v. Wyzyn-
ski, 581 F. Supp. 1550 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (restitution order of $25,000 upheld even though
the defendant was unemployed).
66. VWPA, supra note 4, at S 6.
67. Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 11. The guidelines were issued
on the last possible day, July 9, 1983. It should also be noted that these guidelines
have no binding effect on the courts. This disclaimer is included in the guidelines.
Id. at 33,777.
68. Id. at 33,775. Specifically, one of the stated purposes of the guidelines
was to "enhance the assistance which victims and witnesses provide in criminal cases
and to assist victims in recovering from their losses to the fullest extent possible
consistent with available resources." Id. However, other than the attempt to define
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The guidelines suggest that the instances when restitution would
be appropriate are those situations in which a serious crime is in-
volved. 9 The definition given for a "serious crime" is a "criminal
offense that involves personal violence, attempted or threatened per-
sonal violence, or significant property loss.'"" Oddly, the guidelines
address only "serious crimes" while S 3579 refers to "offenses" under
Title 18 or of air piracy that result in property loss or bodily injury. 71
Regardless of the definition, the guidelines fail to offer concrete
assistance in determining those offenses for which restitution may be
ordered.
7 1
Additionally, the guidelines offer little assistance to sentencing
judges in defining who may receive restitution. However, the
guidelines go beyond the VWPA somewhat in defining "victim. '73 The
definition includes those who suffer direct harm and family members
of a minor homicide victim. 7 ' The guidelines go on to state that in
many circumstances a case-by-case determination will be necessary
to define the victim, especially where there are multiple victims." In
"victim" and "serious crime," the guidelines give only one short paragraph to the sub-
ject of restitution, which is filled with conditions. It reads as follows:
IV. Restitution
Restitution may be ordered under 18 U.S.C. 3579. Consistent with
available resources and their other responsibilities, federal prosecutors should
advocate fully the rights of victims on the issue of restitution unless such
advocacy would unduly prolong or complicate the sentencing proceeding. (Em-
phasis added.)
Id. at 33,777.
69. Id. at 33,775.
70. Id.
71. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(a)(2). The term "serious crime" indicates that higher dollar
amounts would be involved. Because of the offender's limited ability to pay in most
circumstances, S 3579 would be most effectively applied to crimes that were less serious
in nature and involved lower dollar amounts.
72. The offense may be the presentence offense, the offense for which convic-
tion was had, the offenses which were originally charged, or offenses unrelated to
the charged offenses. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
74. Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 11, at 33,775. The definition
also states that federal agencies shall not be considered victims for purposes of Part
II of the guidelines, which address personal services rendered to a victim. Id. See
also United States v. Fountain, No. 84-1939 (7th Cir. July 8, 1985) (Available Oct. 1,
1985, on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cir File). This definition still leaves many unanswered
questions. What happens to families of victims who must provide lifelong care for
the victim because of the nature of the victim's injuries? Nor is mention made of in-
surers or other possible compensators.
75. The example given is a mail fraud case. There may be several victims,
many who may be difficult to identify. Id.
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some cases, the full range of victim assistance may not be available
because of the nature of the victim,"6 but the guidelines prompt Justice
Department personnel to "err on the side of providing rather than
withholding assistance."" While the guidelines offer some additional
clarification beyond the VWPA itself of who may be considered a vic-
tim,"8 the definition is far from exhaustive.
The absence of specific standards to determine restitution has
prompted at least one district court to rule that the VWPA is
unconstitutional as violative of the fifth, seventh, and fourteenth
amendments. In United States v. Welden,"9 three defendants were con-
victed of violating 18 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(1), the kidnapping statute.0 At
the sentencing hearing, the defendants challenged the constitutional-
ity of the restitution order." The Welden court held that the VWPA
violated the defendants' constitutional rights and thus refused to order
restitution.2
Even though Welden has subsequently been overruled,' the ques-
tions raised by the case have generated considerable discussion.
Several courts' and commentators' have continued to discuss the con-
76. See supra note 75.
77. Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 11, at 33,775.
78. See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
79. 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Satter-
field, 743 F.2d 827 (l1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 2362 (1985).
80. Id. at 517. The defendants murdered one of their victims, kidnapped and
sexually assaulted another victim, and damaged the car of a third victim. A condition
of their sentence was that the defendants make restitution to one of the victims. Id.
81. Id. The defendants alleged that their fifth, sixth, seventh, and fourteenth
amendment rights had been violated by the VWPA. Id. at 526. The court answered
that it would not sidestep the important constitutional challenge. Id. at 517. In fact,
the court went beyond the pleadings of the petitioners and considered the constitu-
tionality of the VWPA in light of the eighth amendment, as well as the fifth, sixth,
seventh, and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 532-35.
82. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 534-36.
83. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
84. See United States v. Fountain, No. 84-1939 (7th Cir. July 8, 1985) (Available
Oct. 1, 1985, on LEXIS Genfed Library, Cir File); United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d
475 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, __ U.S. .. 105 S. Ct. 599,
83 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1984); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (l1th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ciambrone,
602 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Brown, 587 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.
Pa. 1984).
85. Note, Victim Impact Statements and Restitution: Making the Punishment
Fit the Victim, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 301 (1984); Note, The Unconstitutionality of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act Under the Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1590 (1984); Note, Where Offenders Pay for Their Crimes-Victim Restitution and its
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stitutionality of the VWPA. The VWPA has been challenged as
violative of the seventh amendment for failure to provide a jury trial
on the issue of damages," and as violative of fifth and fourteenth
amendments for lacking ascertainable standards so as to offend due
process and equal protection." Another problem with the VWPA is
the possibility of revocation of probation or parole for failure to pay
restitution, which has led to challenges based on the eighth amend-
ment that forbids cruel and unusual punishment.8 Thus, the VWPA
continues to be challenged on many constitutional grounds.
The seventh amendment challenges to the VWPA are based upon
the argument that its provisions turn a restitution order into a civil
judgment, and as such, the offender is entitled to a jury trial." There
are three prongs to this assertion. The first prong is that the VWPA
is compensatory in nature, and therefore the penalty imposed is civil
rather than criminal. The second prong is that the provision which
forbids the offender from denying any essential allegations in a subse-
quent civil proceeding gives a collateral estoppel effect. Thus, if the
offender is denied the opportunity to challenge any of the facts leading
to the restitution order in subsequent proceedings, he should be en-
titled to a jury trial in the first instance.2 Finally, the third prong
of the argument is that the provision allowing for enforcement of the
restitution order in the same manner as a civil judgment transforms
the order to a civil judgment.9 3 Hence, the restitution order is a civil
Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685 (1984); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial
to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 671 (1984); Recent Decisions, The Constitutionality of the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 35 ALA. L. REV. 529 (1984); Recent Cases, Criminal Law-
Sentencing-Restitution-The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act of 1982 Violate the Fifth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States-United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), 53 CIN. L.
REV. 263 (1984).
86. See supra note 84.
87. See, e.g., Palma, 760 F.2d at 477-79; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 839-43; Florence,
741 F.2d at 1068-69; Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 566-67.
88. See Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 568-69.
89. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 533-34. See also Note, The Unconstitutionality of
the Victim and Witness Protection Act Under the Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1590, 1615 (1984); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 63 TEX. L. REV. 671, 691 (1984).
90. See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 63 TEX. L. REV. 671, 673 (1984).
91. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 533-34. The Welden court incorrectly referred to
this effect as "res judicata." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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judgment because the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars."'
Each prong of this argument leads to the conclusion that the VWPA
violates the seventh amendment because the offender does not have
the benefit of a jury determination of the amount of restitution.
However, the courts that have examined the seventh amendment
challenge to the VWPA have concluded that the offender is not en-
titled to a jury determination of the amount of restitution.9 5 Even
though the restitution order may be compensatory in nature, it can-
not be equated to a civil proceeding because the victim has no control
over the outcome of the case.' Additionally, there is no constitutional
requirement that a jury determine a defendant's sentence. Congress
may decide whether a penalty is to be characterized as civil or
criminal,98 and the legislative intent is clear in the context of the
VWPA. As to the challenge that the restitution order has collateral
estoppel effect, courts have rejoined that collateral estoppel applies
only to the underlying criminal offense and not to the facts leading
to the restitution order.'00 Jury determinations of fact have always
been accorded this effect.' Finally, civil enforcement does not
transform a criminal penalty into a civil judgment.'2 The federal
government is able to enforce criminal penalties in civil actions under
18 U.S.C. S 3565, and the VWPA merely extends this right to crime
victims.' 3 Thus, there is considerable authority to support the pro-
position that the VWPA does not violate the seventh amendment.
Another challenge to the constitutionality of the VWPA is that
it lacks sufficient standards to guide judges during sentencing, and
thus violates the due process requirements of the fifth amendment.' 4
However, the due process that is required at sentencing is somewhat
94. Id.
95. See supra note 84.
96. See Palma, 760 F.2d at 479; Brown, 744 F.2d at 910. The victim is not
allowed to cross-examine the defendant, nor is he able to testify about the extent
of his losses. Id.
97. Brown, 744 F.2d at 909.
98. Palma, 760 F.2d at 479; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 836-37; Florence, 741 F.2d
at 1068.
99. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 836-37.
100. Palma, 760 F.2d at 479; Brown, 744 F.2d at 910; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at
837-38; Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 567; Brown, 587 F. Supp. at 1007.
101. See supra note 100.
102. Brown, 744 F.2d at 910; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 838; Florence, 741 F.2d
at 1068.
103. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 838.
104. Palma, 760 F.2d at 477; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 839; Florence, 741 F.2d
at 1067; Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 565.
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less than required during the trial.' The offender's due process rights
are limited at sentencing to avoid full scale evidentiary hearings which
could unduly prolong or complicate the sentencing process.'"6 Under
the VWPA, the offender is given the opportunity to contest the facts
relied upon to support the restitution order.' 7 Moreover, the offender
may only challenge the VWPA as it affects his rights.' Thus, the
mere possibility of due process violations in the future will not render
the VWPA unconstitutional on its face.'" Courts agree that the VWPA
contains sufficient standards to protect the offender's due process
rights at sentencing."
The fourteenth amendment challenge to the VWPA also relates
to the alleged lack of ascertainable standards to guide judges during
sentencing. Under the aegis of equal protection, offenders allege that
the lack of standards in the VWPA leads to disparate sentencing
results."' But the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals points out that
it is constitutionally permissible to treat similarly situated people dif-
ferently at sentencing."2 Moreover, an advantage of the VWPA is that
the judge can individualize the restitution order to the circumstances
of each case. 3 Therefore, the VWPA does not violate equal protec-
tion because disparate sentencing results are expected."4
The final constitutional challenge to the VWPA is that it violates
the eighth amendment. Offenders allege that the possibility of revoca-
tion of parole or probation for failure to pay restitution is cruel and
unusual punishment."5 Before revoking parole or probation, the VWPA
requires that the parole board or probation officer consider the good
105. See, e.g., Palma, 760 F.2d at 477; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 840; United States
v. Stephens, 699 F.2d 534, 537 (11th Cir. 1983); Note, Where Offenders Pay for Their
Crimes-Victim Restitution and its Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685, 714-15
(1984).
106. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 840.
107. Id. The offender may challenge the information in the victim impact state-
ment concerning his resources and needs as well as the losses alleged by the victim.
See Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 566-67.
108. Palma, 760 F.2d at 477.
109. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 839.
110. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 841; Florence, 741 F.2d at 1069; Ciambrone, 602
F. Supp. at 566-67.
111. Palma, 760 F.2d at 478; Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 565; Welden, 568 F.
Supp. at 535.
112. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 841 citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
See also Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 567.
113. Palma, 760 F.2d at 478; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 841.
114. See supra note 113.
115. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 568.
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faith attempts of the offender to pay restitution and to consider his
financial resources."' However, the recent Supreme Court decision in
Bearden v. Georgia"7 also requires that the officials consider alter-
native forms of punishment before revocation of parole or probation
for failure to pay a fine. " 8 Although the VWPA does not expressly
require consideration of alternative forms of punishment, the list of
factors to consider in S 3579(g) is not exclusive."9 To meet the re-
quirements of the eighth amendment, courts applying the VWPA must
not only consider the good faith attempts of the offender to pay
restitution, but they must also consider alternative forms of punish-
ment before revoking parole or probation."°
Although some courts have admitted that the VWPA could be
applied unconstitutionally, the statute has been upheld as valid on
its face. 2' Sentencing judges must be careful to avoid due process
problems under the fifth amendment,"2 and they must also comply
with the requirements of Bearden before revoking parole or proba-
tion to avoid eighth amendment violations." Thus, while the VWPA
has survived constitutional challenges to date, problems in applying
it constitutionally could occur in the future.
C. The Purposes of Restitution
Judges must not only consider the constitutional demands of the
criminal justice system when applying the VWPA, but they must also
consider the purposes of punishment that restitution serves. Restitu-
tion as a criminal sanction has many and varied purposes. The political
impetus behind most restitution statutes seems to be a reawakening
of the need to make the victim financially whole.'24 The goal of restor-
116. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(g) (1982).
117. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
118. 461 U.S. at 668-69.
119. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 843; Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 569.
120. Palma, 760 F.2d at 479; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 843; Ciambrone, 602 F.
Supp. at 569.
121. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 839; Florence, 741 F.2d at 1068.
122. Brown, 744 F.2d at 909 (the difference between restitution and a civil judg-
ment is that restitution occurs only after an adjudication of guilt); Satterfield, 743 F.2d
at 839 n.10 (due process violations may occur if the offender is required to pay restitution
for crimes of which no jury found him guilty).
123. Satterfield, 443 F.2d at 843 (the court must consider alternative forms of
punishment before revoking probation or parole); Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 569 (the
VWPA's list of factors is not exclusive; the court must consider alternative forms
of punishment as well).
124. For example, the legislative history of the VWPA is filled with comments
about the plight of the forgotten victim. Generally there is a perceived need to make
19851
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ing the victim to his pre-crime status often fails in restitution pro-
grams because of the failure to apprehend the offender and because
of the offender's limited resources. '25 Operationally, the goals of most
restitution programs must include rehabilitation of the offender.12
Historically, there were six goals of restitution in small scale
societies. 27 The first purpose was prevention; restitution prevented
the perpetration of an offense from escalating into a feud between
groups.12' This purpose of preventing feuds between groups is no
longer useful in modern society. The second goal of restitution was
rehabilitation; in small scale societies it was necessary to reintegrate
the offender into the community as a useful participant." While the
offender does not have to be an economically productive asset to
modern society, rehabilitation is often mentioned as a goal of restitu-
tion." Rehabilitation is used in modern penal theories as a method
for the offender to regain his self-respect and to return the offender
the victim feel as if he has a role in the criminal justice system and to make the
offender pay for the victim's losses. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2515-16.
125. H. Edelhertz, Legal and Operational Issues in the Implementation of Restitu-
tion Within the Criminal Justice System, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63-64 (J.
Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977). In many instances the offender may not be appre-
hended, and if he is, the plea bargaining process may reduce the charges brought
against him. Both of these factors reduce the victim's chances for receiving restitu-
tion. Galaway, Toward the Rational Development of Restitution in RESTITUTION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77, 82 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977). Edelhertz suggests that
state compensation programs can better serve the victims' interest in receiving full
reparations in the broadest range of cases. Edelhertz, at 63. Congress has faced the
shortcomings of restitution with the enactment of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2171 (1984). The Victims of Crime Act authorizes the alloca-
tion of federal funds to state victim compensation programs that are non-discriminatory
in the treatment of victims of crime. The federal funds allow greater compensation
to crime victims regardless of whether the offender is apprehended or whether the
offender has adequate funds to reimburse his victim.
126. Edelhertz, supra note 125, at 64. Programs that concentrated only on the
benefits to the victim would disregard the offender's limited resources, which might
lead the offender to further criminal acts to find the resources to pay the victim. Id.
127. Nader & Combs-Schilling, supra note 23, at 34-35.
128. Id. at 34.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Galaway, supra note 125, at 83-84. Galaway propounds four pur-
poses of modern restitution, as well as the historical purpose of reintegrating the offender
into society. The four purposes listed by Galaway include: less severe or alternative
methods of punishment thereby reducing the size of prison populations; rehabilitation
of the offender which provides a positive method for the offender to regain his self-
respect; reductions of the demands on the criminal justice system; and reduction of
society's need for retribution. Id. at 83-84.
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to an equal status with non-offenders.13 ' The third purpose of restitu-
tion in small scale societies was restitution itself; the needs of the
victim were addressed.'32 According to the legislative history of the
VWPA, this purpose is the primary motivation for passage of the
VWPA.'33 The restitution purpose is also encompassed in the theory
of retribution as it offers the victim a method to express his hostility
within the criminal justice system.'" Thus, many of the historical and
modern purposes of restitution amend the offender's relationship with
society and the victim.
Additional purposes of restitution in small scale societies, some
of which are still viable today, were designed to protect and advance
society's interest as a whole. Another purpose of restitution in small
scale societies was the restatement of values; by requiring restitu-
tion, the community's rules were articulated.'35 An additional purpose
was socialization; formation of the society's rules educated the com-
munity of the norms and values of the society and eventually provided
a form of social control. 3 ' Neither of these purposes is dominant in
modern society because our laws are rather set and well-known.
However, the legislature may change the laws and types of punish-
ment, a prime example being the VWPA itself. Therefore, these pur-
poses may have nominal validity today. The final purpose of restitu-
tion historically was regulation and deterrence; those closely associated
with the offender were forced to share the punishment, thus, they
131. Id. See McAnany, Restitution as Idea and Practice: The Retributive Process
in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 15, 20 (B. Galaway & J. Hudson eds.
1978).
132. Nader & Combs-Schilling, supra note 23, at 34.
133. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2516.
134. McAnany, supra note 131, at 20-21. McAnany feels there are several types
of retribution. Expressive retribution denounces the criminal activity, although this
in itself is not sufficient "punishment." Formal retribution punishes the offender simply
because he has broken the law. Equalizing retribution is the type discussed in the
text, it returns the offender to an equal status with non-offenders after the punish-
ment. Desert retribution punishes the offender because he deserves it; limits on punish-
ment are set by the legislature. Requital retribution exacts a morally right act from
a morally wrong act; it offers the offender a chance for moral reform. Id. McAnany
argues that retribution is the only justifiable form of punishment. Id. at 20. In a sense,
his classifications encompass many of the other theories of punishment. For example,
equalizing retribution closely parallels rehabilitation. See also Rothnard, Punishment
and Proportionality in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE
LEGAL PROCESS 259, 270 (R. Barnett & J. Hagel eds. 1977) (Rothnard believes that
"equal treatment for equal crime" is the only just means of punishment).
135. Nader & Combs-Shilling, supra note 23, at 34.
136. Id. at 35.
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were motivated to deter the offender from further crime."3 7 Deter-
rence and regulation certainly are valid goals today with the hope
that offenders will cease criminal activity if they must literally "pay"
for their crimes."3 8 All three of these goals, restatement of values,
socialization, and regulation and deterrence, serve to protect society
from the offender.
Whatever the goals or purposes of restitution, it is apparent that
the need for victim-oriented relief is only one aspect of restitution.
Some state courts have gone so far as to conclude that rehabilitation
of the offender and deterrence from further crime are the primary
duty of the court, as opposed to reimbursement of the victim.'39 Thus,
even in the VWPA, where the stated goals are victim-oriented, the
correctional aims of restitution must be noted. It is essential to
remember the purpose of victim restitution when determining who
should receive restitution for which offenses.
II. THE DEFINITION OF "OFFENSE" IN THE VWPA
The VWPA employs the term "offense" to describe a criminal
act for which restitution may be ordered.'40 The VWPA specifically
states that, "the court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an
offense under this title .... may order .. .that the defendant make
restitution to any victim of the offense.'' This wording implies that
the offender may be ordered to make restitution only for those of-
fenses for which he was convicted. However, the VWPA also refers
to offenses that "result in" either bodily injury or property damage.'42
These subsequent phrases cast doubt on the original implication, and
it may be that the results of the offense, rather than the offense for
which conviction was had, is to be the touchstone for the restitution
order. Unfortunately, the results of an offense may spring from actions
by the offender that were not included in the offense for which he
137. Id. The immediate family or group of the offender were usually involved
with the payment of restitution, thus considerable pressure was put on the group
to deter the offender from further criminal activity. Id.
138. See, e.g., Title, Restitution and Deterrence: An Evaluation of Compatibility
in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 33 (B. Galaway & J. Hudson eds. 1978).
139. Coles v. State, 48 Md. App. 647, 429 A.2d 1029, 1034 (1981) (the primary
duty of the court is to rehabilitate the defendant); In Re Trantino Parole Application,
89 N.J. 347, 446 A.2d 104, 113 (1982) (restitution is meant to be a compelling reminder
of the harm done, for the purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence, rather than the
mitigation of the harm done).
140. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(a)(1), (b) (1982).
141. Id. S 3579(a)(1) (emphasis added).
142. Id. S 3579(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
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was convicted. An example of a situation where the results of an of-
fense are not included in the offense of conviction might be where
personal property is damaged in the course of a bank robbery. Should
the owner of a car used in the getaway receive restitution for damage
caused by fire to the car even though the offender was convicted only
of bank robbery?' Consequently, sentencing judges implementing the
VWPA may be faced with a dilemma; should they order restitution
only for the offense for which conviction was had, or may they in-
clude related offenses that resulted in victimization?
There are two major approaches to the problem of interpreting
"offense" as it is used in the VWPA. First, there is the limited ap-
proach found in the Federal Probation Act, which restricts the defini-
tion to the "offense of conviction" standard.' 4 Second, there is the
unlimited approach which may include a variety of related offenses. " 5
The definition of "offense" is relevant to the ultimate interpretation
of the VWPA because "offense" is a prerequisite to the definition of
the victim.
A. The Limited Approach
The limited approach, which defines "offense" as the "offense
for which conviction was had," originated in the Federal Probation
Act which authorizes judges to order restitution only as a condition
of probation.' 6 The VWPA does not have such limiting language,
although there may be sufficient justification for applying the limita-
tions to the VWPA. There is a long history of case law support for
the imposition of restitution only for the "offense of conviction.".. 7 The
143. These are the actual facts of United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511 (6th
Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the holding in this case, see supra note 211 and accom-
panying text.
144. 18 U.S.C. S 3561 (1982), which states that as a condition of probation, the
defendant "may be required to make restitution or reparations to aggrieved parties
for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had ...." Id.
145. Related offenses might include offenses that are not formally charged.
See Krasno, supra note 5, at 470; Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal
Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 536 (1982).
146. 18 U.S.C. S 3561 (1982). The judge may not order restitution separately
or in addition to any other penalty under the Probation Act. The Judiciary Commit-
tee saw this as a shortcoming of the current state of federal law because restitution
is often an afterthought rather than an inevitable sanction. Resolving this problem
was one of the motivations for the VWPA. SENATE REPORT, supri note 1, at 30,
reprinled in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2536.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1982) (restitution
limited to the amount for which defendant was convicted); Dougherty v. White, 689
F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1982) (restitution could not be ordered for counts that were dis-
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basic policy behind this specific standard is that it ensures that the
offender is ordered to pay restitution only for those offenses for which
he has had the opportunity to adjudicate his guilt."8 However, there
are difficulties with this approach because the restriction to the "of-
fense of conviction" standard may have a negative effect on the pro-
secutor's willingness to negotiate a plea bargain."9 Despite its
drawbacks, the limited approach to the definition of "offense" appears
to best serve the interests of justice.
A landmark case in support of the "offense of conviction" stan-
dard is United States v. Follette."' In Follette, the defendant was con-
victed on charges of embezzlement and conversion of United States
postal funds in the amount of $203.99.51 As a condition of her
suspended sentence, the court ordered the defendant to make restitu-
tion of $466.28 to the surety company that had reimbursed the govern-
ment."5 2 By the end of her probation period the defendant had not
made complete restitution. Therefore, she petitioned the court for an
extension of probation so that she could complete her payments
missed); State v. Labure, 427 So. 2d 855 (La. 1983) (erroneous to order restitution to
a victim of burglary for which defendant had not pled guilty); Mason v. State, 46 Md.
App. 1, 415 A.2d 315 (1980) (restitution limited by the losses established by the convic-
tion, which serves as a predicate for the sentence). Note, Restitution in the Criminal
Process: Procedures for Fixing the Offender's Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 505, 517 (1984).
The author feels that no legislative reform is needed to maintain the "offense of con-
viction" standard, because of the judicial construction that has applied to S 3561. Id.
He cites to other authors who believe that the "offense of conviction" case precedents
of . 3561 have relevance to the interpretation of the VWPA. Id. at 517 n.51 citing
A. PARTRIDGE, A. CHASET & W. ELDRIDGE. THE SENTENCING OPTIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGES 9 (rev. ed. 1983).
148. Project, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution Provision of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 507, 511 (1984). Other
policies behind a limited approach to "offense" include: 1) it guarantees that the restitu-
tion order is directly related to the criminal act; 2) the rehabilitative effect of restitu-
tion may be diminished or eliminated if the offender doesn't recognize the relation-
ship between the restitution order and the offense; and 3) if the offender has not been
found guilty of a particular offense and is then ordered to make restitution for that
offense, he may feel no responsibility for the consequences of his actions. Id. at 511-12.
149. Id. at 512. If the prosecutor's goal is to obtain the highest amount of restitu-
tion possible for the victim, he may be unwilling to enter into plea bargaining with
the offender under the "offense of conviction" standard. Lessor offenses bargained
for would lower the victim's restitution. Another problem with the limited approach
is that victims of related offenses that do not fall under Title 18 crimes would not
receive restitution under the VWPA. Id. However, those victims might be able to
receive restitution under state programs.
150. 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
151. Id. at 953-54.
152. Id. at 954.
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without further penalty.' When considering the petition, the court
questioned, inter alia, the amount of the original restitution order.' 4
The Follette court ruled that restitution must be limited to the "ac-
tual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was
had." ' The court would not stretch the convicted offense to cover
similar offenses committed by the defendant against the same or
various parties.'-' Many other courts have followed the lead of Follette
by restricting the amount of restitution to the "offense of conviction"
standard.' 7
While these and other courts have strictly construed the defini-
tion of "offense" under the Probation Act, some courts have created
inroads on the limited approach to restitution. The potential for flex-
ibility first became apparent in United States v. Taylor,'58 where
although the court upheld the "offense of conviction" standard, they
concluded that upon remand the lower court could consider restitution
for offenses that were admitted, but not charged.'59 Thus, an admis-
sion of restitutionary liability is allowed as an exception to the "offense
of conviction" standard in some courts.' 0 Several states have codified
153. Id.
154. Id. at 955.
155. Id. The order of restitution was modified to $203.99.
156. Id. The Follette court cited People v. Funk, 117 Misc. 778, 193 N.Y.S. 202
(1921), in support of its holding. In Funk, the court upheld restitution of $3.08, the
amount for which the defendant had been convicted of embezzling, although the
employer estimated the defendant had stolen $1,500.00 over the years.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699 (11th Cir. 1983) (in multiple
count indictments, restitution could be ordered only for those counts that resulted
in conviction); United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1982) (without a plea agree-
ment to pay, restitution cannot be ordered for dismissed counts); United States v.
Beuchler, 557 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1977) (limitations on the Probation Act prevented
a discussion of due process issues, restitution beyond the offense of conviction was
struck down); State v. Bass, 53 N.C. App. 40, 280 S.E.2d 7 (1981) (restitution for other
crimes may constitute imprisonment for debt).
158. 305 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962).
159. Id. at 187. The defendant was indicted for tax evasion and the sentencing
court ordered restitution for periods that were not covered in the indictment. The
Taylor court struck down the order, but with the conditions stated in the text. Id.
Thus, Taylor became a case on which other courts could rely for a judicially created
exception to the "offense of conviction" rule.
160. See, e.g., United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052 (7th Cir. 1982). Another judicially created exception
is when the offender agrees to restitutionary liability during the plea bargaining phase
for conduct other than that for which he is charged. Project, supra note 148, at 512-13.
See Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. McLaughlin,
512 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1981). Arguably, these two exceptions are the same, merely
the timing of the admission is varied.
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the admissions exception in their restitution statutes as well. 6' Some
have argued that the admissions exception makes sense as applied
to the Probation Act and that the exception should be extended to
the VWPA."6' Others have contended that, because the admission may
occur at any time, before prosecution has begun or even uninten-
tionally, the exception should be strictly monitored." Without careful
enforcement of the admissions exception, the exception may give rise
to restitution that is not limited to the "offense of conviction" at all.
The "offense of conviction" standard has been at issue in very
few cases under the VWPA. In those cases where it has been touched
upon, the controversy centers around the meaning of the "results"
of the offense.' u Courts have questioned how far they may take the
causal connection between the crime and the damage caused." 5
However, the majority of courts dealing with the issue have limited
restitution to the results of the offense for which the offender was
convicted." Even those courts that have ordered restitution for results
beyond the "offense of conviction" have qualified their holdings.""
Therefore, although not directly stated, courts construing the VWPA
tend to follow the "offense of conviction" standard.
161. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 15-18-66(1) (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. S 910.1(3) (West
Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. S 99-37-3(1) (Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 31-17-1(A)(3),
(4) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. S 137.103(1) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 23A-28-2(3)
(Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-201(3)(a) (1983).
162. Project, supra note 148, at 513-14. One author believes that there are not
any problems in determining restitutionary liability when the defendant confesses
responsibility. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE S 6.37 (1983).
163. Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for Fixing the Of-
fender's Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 505, 516 (1984). The author argues that unless both
the prosecutor and the defendant benefit from the bargain, the admission exception
will not function properly. Id.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (possi-
ble threat from the offender's mother which caused the victim to miss work was a
result of the offense); United States v. Richard, 738 F.2d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 1984)
(loss of money on the day of the robbery resulted from the offense); United States
v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (expenses claimed must result
directly from the offender's actions).
165. United States v. Trettenaro, 601 F. Supp. 183, 185 (D. Colo. 1985) (ex-
penses connected with recovery of stolen property are not compensible); United States
v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Congress did not intend all conse-
quences of the offender's act to be covered by the restitution order).
166. See. e.g., Keith, 754 F.2d at 1393 (restitution ordered was for expenses
for nonmedical treatment for assault for which offender was convicted) Richard, 738
F.2d at 1123 (restitution ordered for unrecovered money resulting from bank robbery
of which the offender was convicted); United States v. Hendley, 585 F. Supp. 458 (D.
Colo. 1984) (offender ordered to pay costs of arresting him for trespass for which he
was convicted).
167. See United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1985) (restitu-
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B. The Unlimited Approach
The unlimited approach to the definition of "offense" might in-
clude any offense related to the offense of conviction that resulted
in victimization.' 8 Such an interpretation of "offense" would further
one of the goals of the VWPA by providing greater relief to the vic-
tims. '69 But while furthering that goal, the courts must also refrain
from infringing on the offender's rights.'0 Additionally, the rule of
lenity requires that federal criminal statutes be construed against the
party seeking to impose a penalty and in favor of the party against
whom the penalties are to be imposed.' Despite these restrictions,
the unlimited approach remains at issue because of the lack of specific
language within the VWPA. Several states have adopted the unlimited
approach in regard to victim restitution, and the federal courts may
draw authority from the rulings in those states.'
The rationale behind the statutes and rulings incorporating the
unlimited approach is that the court is not bound by the adjudication
of guilt because the sentencing phase is a separate part of the trial.' 3
But an important caveat to the unlimited approach is that it has only
been utilized in conjunction with probation or parole."' The applica-
tion of the unlimited approach may not be proper when applied to
the VWPA because restitution may be ordered as an exclusive sanc-
tion.' When restitution is ordered as an exclusive sanction, the due
tion ordered for arson for which the offender was not convicted, however, the court
realized there could be constitutional problems because his guilt on the issue had not
been fully adjudicated); United States v. Allison, 599 F. Supp. 958, 959 (N.D. Ala. 1985)
(although the court urged the broadest interpretation of the victimization, the judge
realized that the criminal activity must be clearly demonstrated in criminal trial).
168. Krasno, supra note 5, at 470. "Offense" might mean the offenses contained
in the presentence report, the entire conduct as alleged in the indictment, offenses
admitted in a guilty plea, or admissions made to a probation officer. Id.
169. Project, supra note 148, at 515.
170. Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 11, at 33,774.
171. See United States v. Bell, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
172. Some states that have codified this unlimited approach are: ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 13-603(c) (Supp. 1984); CAL. PENAL CODE S 1203.1 (West Supp. 1984); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38 S 1005-5-6(b) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. S
973.09(1)(a) (West Supp. 1984). See People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 487, 124 Cal. Rptr.
905, 909, 541 P.2d 545, 549 (1975) (the defendant was acquitted on some counts of
check fraud, and convicted of others; the court ordered restitution for all counts); see
also People v. Cummings, 120 Ariz. 69, 583 P.2d 1389 (1978); People v. Miller, 256 Cal.
App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967, People v. Pettit, 88 Mich. App. 203, 276 N.W.2d
878 (1979); Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977).
173. See supra note 172.
174. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 162, at 289.
175. Several authors have found the unlimited approach unacceptable in con-
junction with restitution-only programs or with the VWPA. See N. COHEN & J. GOBERT,
1985]
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process rights of the offender become an overriding consideration, and
the unlimited approach to the definition of "offense" is inappropriate.'76
Thus, although an unlimited definition of "offense" may be acceptable
in some jurisdictions, the policies behind such systems are not ap-
plicable to the VWPA.
III. WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A "VICTIM" UNDER THE
VWPA?
Once the definition of the term "offense" is narrowed, the next
question is who should be considered a "victim" for purposes of the
VWPA. The legislative history of the VWPA clearly states that its
major goal is to provide restitution to the victims of Title 18 crimes.'
Unfortunately, the VWPA does not clearly define who should be con-
sidered a "victim." The VWPA merely states that restitution may
be ordered to "any victim" of an offense under Title 18.78 The VWPA
also mentions that those who compensate the victim " may receive
restitution if all of the other victims have first been reimbursed for
their losses."8 But doubts exist whether compensators themselves may
be considered victims if they suffer a financial loss due to the of-
fender's actions. Other questions are whether family members of the
victim who suffer a loss may receive restitution from the offender
and whether the government may receive restitution for the expenses
of prosecuting the offender. A further inquiry is whether charities
are eligible to receive restitution if the victims cannot be easily iden-
tified. These questions must be answered before the VWPA can func-
tion effectively.
supra note 162, at 289; Project, supra note 148, at 515-16; Note, Restitution in the
Criminal Process: Procedures for Fixing the Offenders' Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 505, 513
(1984).
176. Although the court did not deal directly with the issue of definitions within
the VWPA, Judge Kravitch in United States v. Satterfield mentioned that the lack
of a definition of the "victim of the offense" is likely to cause litigation in the future.
Judge Kravitch specifically states, "If a defendant were held liable for restitution to
victims of crimes of which no jury found him guilty a due process violation may very
well occur." 743 F.2d 817, 839 n.10 (11th Cir. 1984). Additionally, the court in United
States v. Durham realized that due process violations may exist when the offender
is ordered to pay restitution on charges for which his guilt has not been adjudicated.
But the Durham court refused to consider these possible constitutional violations in
the specific restitution order because the offender had not properly preserved the
issue for appeal. 755 F.2d 511, 514 (6th Cir. 1985).
177. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2516.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a) (1982).
179. See supra note 18 for examples of possible compensators.
180. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(e)(1) (1982).




To qualify for restitution as a direct victim of a Title 18 crime,
the victim must have suffered a property loss or bodily injury. 8' It
would seem that the qualification of a direct victim would be obvious
from the criminal proceedings. For example, if the victim was injured
during the course of a burglary, he should qualify for restitution in
the amount of his property loss, medical expenses incurred, as well
as related expenses for therapy and lost income. A problem arises
because, other than the section that refers to compensators," no other
classification of "victim" is mentioned in the VWPA. Therefore, all
other entities that might be victims under the VWPA must qualify
under a "direct victim" analysis."3
The Federal Probation Act authorizes restitution to "aggrieved
parties" who suffer as a result of the "offense for which conviction
was had." '84 This definition suffers from the same problem as "vic-
tim" in the VWPA; persons entitled to qualify as "aggrieved parties"
are not defined. However, the Probation Act does have a history of
case analysis from which to draw. In Karrell v. United States,"5 the
defendant was convicted of six out of seventeen counts alleging
fraudulent claims under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944.'"
As a condition of probation, the defendant was ordered to pay restitu-
tion to each of eighteen veterans, including one who was not named
in the indictments. 87 The court held that only the six veterans who
had successfully brought their claims against the defendant were en-
titled to restitution as "aggrieved parties." '88 Limitation to the victim
of the offense of conviction is common in many state courts as well. '
181. Id. S 3579(b).
182. Id. S 3579(e)(1).
183. Other classifications of victims include the family of the victim, insurers
and other compensators, the government, and charities. It may be difficult to qualify
as a direct victim even when the individual is injured at the scene of the crime. For
example, in the illustration given in the text, if the victim is merely an innocent
bystander, he may not qualify for restitution because he was not the "direct victim"
of a Title 18 crime.
184. 18 U.S.C. S 3561 (1982).
185. 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950).
186. Id. at 982-83 n.1. She filed false claims for veteran's home loan guaranty
benefits.
187. Id. at 983.
188. Id. at 987. The analysis in KarrelU is a good example of how the defini-
tions of "offense" and "victim" are related. The victims will be defined in terms of
the offense of conviction.
189. See, e.g., People v. Grago, 24 Misc. 2d 739, 741, 204 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777 (1960)
(restitution may only be made to those "directly concerned in the counts of the indict-
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Assuming that the goal of the VWPA is to compensate victims to
the greatest extent possible, the "aggrieved party" interpretation of
"victim" does not meet these needs. Alternatively, the Justice Depart-
ment Guidelines indicate that third parties may also be considered
"victims" for purposes of the VWPA. 19
B. Immediate Family of the Victim
While the Justice Department Guidelines and the legislative
history of the VWPA offer some clarification of the definition of "vic-
tim," the definitions given conflict. The Justice Department Guidelines
of the VWPA provide for restitution for "the immediate family of
a minor or a homicide victim."'91 The Judiciary Committee went fur-
ther to indicate that restitution could be ordered to third parties in-
cluding "friends, family members, or other individuals who have
assisted the victim or the victim's family."'92 Regardless of whether
the Justice Department Guidelines or the legislative history of the
VWPA control the definition of "victim," neither give a judge ade-
quate direction in determining when family members of the victim
should receive restitution. Thus, case law from state courts must be
analyzed to solve this problem.
State courts are widely split on the issue of whether the family
of the victim may benefit from restitution. In state courts where
restitution is allowed to family members of the victim, the cases
usually involve homicide victims.'93 The rationale for allowing restitu-
tion to family members is that the parents or spouse of the victim
have suffered a loss because of the offender's criminal act, and the
offender should reimburse the family for such loss."4 Usually state
courts that deny restitution to family members of the victim are bound
ment upon which the defendant stands convicted"); State v. Calderilla, 34 Or. App.
1007, 580 P.2d 578 (1978) (a bank was a direct victim when it absorbed the loss on
a former employee's forged check).
190. Justice Department Guidelines, supr i note 11, at 33,775.
191. Id. at 33,775.
192. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2539.
193. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 162, at 285. See, e.g., Shenah v. Hender-
son, 106 Ariz. 399, 476 P.2d 854 (1970) (restitution to parents of deceased is proper
because they suffered a loss at her death); State v. Green, 29 N.C. App. 574, 225 S.E.2d
170, cert. denied, 290 N.C. App. 665, 228 S.E.2d 455 (1976) (same); State v. Gunderson,
77 Wash. 2d 226, 444 P.2d 156 (1968) (same).
194. See supra note 193.
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by specifically worded statutes that allow restitution only to the im-
mediate and direct victim. 9 5
However, one court has effectively circumvented that limitation.
In People v. Deadmond,'9" the Colorado Supreme Court overruled the
order of restitution to the husband of the victim of vehicular
homicide.'97 But the court remanded the case for a determination of
which portion of the restitution should have been awarded to the vic-
tim, payable to her representative.'9 8 Hence, the husband would even-
tually benefit from the restitution order. In 1977, Oregon amended
its restitution statute to include restitution for persons other than
the direct victim.'99 Thus, previous Oregon cases which denied restitu-
tion to family members of the victim have no effect on cases com-
mencing after 1976.0 The trend in state courts appears to be moving
toward allowing restitution to family members of the victim, regardless
of strictly worded statutes.
Despite this trend, the federal courts have not offered any
guidance on the issue,' and the VWPA itself does not mention family
members." 2 Conversely, both the Justice Department Guidelines and
the legislative history of the VWPA indicate that family members
may be eligible for restitution."° But both sources offer different situa-
tions where family members of the victim could receive restitution.2 4
The solution that would best meet the victim-oriented goals of the
VWPA is to combine the suggestions of the legislative history and
the Justice Department Guidelines. Family members of a deceased
victim obviously suffer a loss and should be reimbursed by the
offender. If the victim is a minor, his losses are absorbed by his
195. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, S 991 (a) (West 1984); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.12. S 6 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
196. 683 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1984).
197. Id. at 774.
198. Id.
199. OR. REV. STAT. S 137.103(4) (1983). "Victim" means any person whom the
court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities ....
200. E.g., State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 552 P.2d 829 (1976) (husband and father
of victims was not an "aggrieved party" and therefore, he could not receive restitution).
201. Before the VWPA, restitution could not be ordered in federal courts unless
it was a condition of probation. 18 U.S.C. S 3651 (1982). Homicide cases, where the
family members of the victim are usually awarded restitution in the state courts, are
generally not encountered in conjunction with probation.
202. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
204. Id.
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parents, who in turn should receive restitution, especially if the
parents must provide medical care for the minor. Additionally, family
members who compensate the victim should be eligible for restitu-
tion because they have suffered a financial loss resulting from the
offender's actions. The VWPA itself should clearly include in its defini-
tion of "victim" family members of the victim who suffer a loss.
C. Insurers and Others Who Compensate the Victim
Insurers who compensate the victim, like family members of the
victim, have received disparate treatment from the courts. Again, the
decision of whether or not to allow restitution to insurers depends
upon the definition of "victim." ' 5 If the jurisdiction involved inter-
prets the relevant statute to allow restitution to parties who suffer
a loss as a result of the offender's crime, restitution has been ordered
to insurers."' On the other hand, in jurisdictions where restitution
is allowed only to the "direct victim" or "aggrieved party," insurers
have been denied restitution.2"7 A few courts have taken the approach
that while the insurer might not receive restitution directly, the vic-
tim should be obligated to reimburse the insurer indirectly once the
victim has received restitution from the offender.00 This approach
seems to be the most sensible because the "direct victims" are made
financially whole and the insurers are compensated as well.
The VWPA does provide that insurers and others who compen-
sate the victim0 9 may receive restitution after all of the "direct
205. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
206. E.g., United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (surety
is an "aggrieved party"); People v. Calhoun, 145 Cal. App. 3d 568, 193 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1983) (restitution allowed to insurance company under California probation law); Peo-
ple v. Alexander, 35 Cal. App. 2d 626, 6 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1960) (restitution to insurer
in arson case); State v. Behrens, 204 Neb. 785, 285 N.W.2d 513 (1979) (restitution to
insurer for medical bills of victim); Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974) (restitution to insurer for medical payments made to victim).
207. E.g., People v. King, 648 P.2d 173 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (restitution to
insurers is not allowed under Colorado adult sentencing law); People v. Grago, 24 Misc.
2d 739, 204 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1960) (victim's insurance company is not an "aggrieved par-
ty"); State v. Getsinger, 27 Or. App. 339, 556 P.2d 147 (1976) (same).
208. See People v. Daugherty, 104 I1. App. 3d 89, 432 N.E.2d 391 (1982) (in-
surance company may have right of subrogation for amounts paid directly to the in-
sured as restitution); State v. Rose, 45 Or. App. 879, 609 P.2d 875 (1980) (insured may
be contractually obligated to repay insurer who compensated insured when the in-
sured receives restitution payments).
209. Others who compensate the victim may be public or private agencies or
simply individuals who have some kind of obligation, moral or otherwise, to help the
victim. An example where restitution was allowed is Ballance v. State, 447 So. 2d
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victims" have been reimbursed. 1 However, the VWPA adds the caveat
in § 3580 that the offender's ability to pay must be considered when
ordering restitution."' Thus, if the offender has limited resources, it
is unlikely that insurers or other compensators will receive restitu-
tion. This result is unfair, especially when the insurer or compensator
is obligated by law, contractually or by statute, to compensate the
victim."2 When the compensator is legally obligated to compensate
the victim, the compensator becomes a victim of the offender's crime
as well. The VWPA should treat the compensator who is legally bound
to compensate the victim on a basis equal to that of the "direct
victim."" 3
D. Government
Despite the confusing statement in the Justice Department
Guidelines that government agencies or departments should not be
considered a "victim" for purposes of the VWPA, " there are situa-
tions where the government is a victim. In cases like United States
v. Follette,"' where the government was the target of embezzlement,
the government is a direct victim. The taxpaying public pays the of-
fender's debt if the offender is not ordered to make restitution.
974 (Fla. App. 1984). In Ballance, the court allowed restitution to a company which
incurred costs to protect an employee who was the victim of extortion. Id. at 976.
See also State v. Yost, 232 Kan. 370, 654 P.2d 458 (1982) (restitution allowed to person
who reimbursed the victim for a worthless check). But see State v. Garrett, 29 Or.
App. 505, 564 P.2d 726 (1977) (restitution denied to humane society that treated dogs
in a conviction for cruelty to animals).
210. 18 U.S.C. S 3579(e)(1) (1982). See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
211. 18 U.S.C. S 3580(a) (1982). There is one federal court that has ordered restitu-
tion to an insurer under the VWPA. United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 513 (6th
Cir. 1985). In Durham, the court ordered restitution to the insurer of an automobile
that was damaged, but the case was remanded for failure to consider the offender's
resources. Id. at 513-15. Therefore, the insurer may not receive restitution after all.
But the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also considered the insurer in United States
v. Davenport, No. 84-3376 (6th Cir. May 9, 1985) (available Oct. 1, on LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Cir file) where the court remanded the case for a determination of whether
the victim had already been compensated by an insurer. If so, the insurer rather than
the victim would be eligible for restitution. Id.
212. Examples of legal obligations include an insurance company bound by an
insurance contract, state compensation programs bound by statute to aid victims of
crime, and family members bound by their legal relationship to provide for the victim.
213. One author suggests that insurance companies should be eligible for restitu-
tion because the insurance buying public pays for the offender's crimes through in-
creased insurance premiums if the insurer is not reimbursed. Project, supra note 148,
at 525.
214. Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 11, at 33,775.
215. 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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Another situation where the government is a direct victim is when
public funds are used to pay the victim through state compensation
programs."' The government is legally bound by statute to compen-
sate the victim, and thus the government should be treated as others
who are legally bound to compensate the victim."'7 Therefore, situa-
tions exist where the government is a direct victim of the offender's
crime and the government should be allowed restitution.
Some states have ordered restitution for expenses incurred by
the government for investigating the offender's crime." In addition,
one federal court has ordered restitution under the VWPA to a cor-
poration under contract with the government for expenses of arresting
a trespasser. ' If the offender has sufficient resources to reimburse
all of his victims, then the government should receive restitution for
investigation and prosecution expenses. This result is justified because
the expenses would not have been incurred but for the offender's ac-
tions. In summary, the VWPA should allow restitution to the govern-
ment when it is a direct victim, otherwise restitution for prosecution
and investigation expenses should be granted to the government only
after the other victims are reimbursed.
E. Charities
Under the Federal Probation Act, charities have occasionally been
the recipients of restitution in instances where the victims of crime
are not easily ascertainable,' a result which could be extended to
216. State compensation programs would pay a victim if the offender is not
apprehended. This discussion applies to instances where the victim has already been
compensated by the state, the offender is later apprehended, tried, convicted, and
ordered to make restitution.
217. See upra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
218. Gonzales v. State, 608 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1980) (restitution to government
ordered for money spent by undercover agent to buy illegal drugs); Milton v. State,
453 So. 2d 137 (Fla. App. 1984) (assessment for expenses incurred by city to investigate
defendant's sale of cannabis); Cuba v. State, 362 So. 2d 29 (Fla. App. 1978) (restitution
allowed for investigative expenses).
219. United States v. Hendley, 585 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1984). The court
ordered restitution to Rockwell International, who was under contract with the Depart-
ment of Energy to operate a nuclear power plant, for expenses of arresting a trespassing
protester. Id. at 459.
220. The victims are not always ascertainable when the public as a whole suf-
fers from corporate price-fixing schemes which would make it administratively im-
possible to reimburse every victim. See, e.g., United States v. William Anderson Co.,
698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982) (the court rejected the government's argument that restitu-
tion could only be ordered to aggrieved parties for actual damages; upheld sentence
ordering corporation to make charitable contributions); United States v. Mitsubishi
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the VWPA. These cases generally involve corporate offenders con-
victed of price-fixing schemes, which results in higher taxes or prices
for goods paid by the public.' However, the legislative history of
the VWPA clearly states that the provisions of S 3579 are not designed
to extend to cases arising under antitrust laws, securities laws, or
the laws of other regulatory agencies.' The rationale behind this ex-
clusion is that these statutes have their own means of restoring the
victim, such as the authorization of treble damages.223 This analysis
ignores the fact that often the public, in addition to the offender's
competitors, suffer from violations of antitrust and securities laws.224
A stronger argument against allowing charities to benefit from cor-
porate restitution is that the charity is not a "victim" in any sense,
and because actual damages have never been assessed.15 The best
solution to this conflict would be to allow charities as recipients of
restitution only in cases where it can clearly be shown that the public
has suffered because of the corporate offenses, such as in price-fixing
schemes, and that there are no easily ascertainable victims. Since it
would be impossible to reimburse every individual, the general public
can benefit from the increased benefits flowing from the charitable
organization. However, restitution to charities should be avoided under
the VWPA where it can be shown that corporate competitors, as well
as the public, suffered directly and measurably.'
Thus, there are several categories of individuals and entities that
should be eligible for restitution under the VWPA. The strongest
arguments for inclusion in the classification of "victim" apply to those
Int'l. Corp. 677 F2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982) (corporation ordered to make contribution of
$90,000 to an ex-offender's program as restitution); United States v. Danilow Pastry
Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court upheld condition of probation that defen-
dants make contributions of pastry to charities for conviction on price-fixing schemes).
221. See supra note 220.
222. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2539.
223. Id.
224. Such violations artificially inflate prices, which the public is forced to pay.
225. Some of the cases that have adopted this rationale and denied restitution
from corporate offenders to charities include: United States v. Missouri Valley Con-
struction Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wright Contracting Co.,
728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F2d 1236 (10th Cir.
1982); United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n., 540 F.2d 1389 (10th
Cir. 1976).
226. Corporate competitors who suffer as a result of the offender's violation
of antitrust or securities laws would then appropriately benefit from the penalties
under those laws, such as receiving treble damages. The public may also suffer in
these cases but corporate competitors can benefit more directly from the damages
mentioned above.
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who suffer a loss of a family member and to those who are legally
obligated to compensate the victim. The language of the VWPA should
specifically indicate who those additional "victims" are.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR PROVIDING ADEQUATE DEFINITIONS FOR THE
VWPA
The vague definitions of the VWPA preclude its providing ade-
quate assistance to crime victims."' Unfortunately, restitution pro-
grams that have as their only purpose victim relief historically fail
because of the limitations on the nature of restitution.22 Thus, cor-
rectional aims should be added to the goals of the VWPA to aid in
its usefulness.
There are a variety of theories that can be applied to restitu-
tion as a correctional tool.229 The theory that most closely aligns with
victim-oriented goals is the theory of retribution. In its most primitive
form, retribution demands revenge for the wrong caused,2 ' which re-
quires that the offender "disgorge his ill-gotten gains ' or pay for
the injury he has caused. The offender is forced to restore the status
quo at his expense, thus the victim exacts his revenge.
The retributive theory of punishment can be expanded to en-
compass other correctional goals, such as rehabilitation. As noted by
Professor Patrick McAnany, "[Elvery system [of punishment] will tend
to collect all justifications within it. But the caution is that we should
try to be precise as possible about how and where these justifica-
tions are invoked."2 2 In his categorization of retributive thought,
McAnany includes "equalizing retribution," which closely parallels the
definition of rehabilitation.' The thrust of "equalizing retribution"
is to return the offender to an equal status with society after he has
been punished by paying the price for his crime.234 In summary, the
retributive theory of punishment can be incorporated into the goals
of the VWPA to meet its stated ends; the victim will receive a
227. The victim oriented goals are discussed in SENATE REPORT, supra note
1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2516.
228. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 127-139 and accompanying text.
230. McAnany, supra note 131, at 20.
231. J. MOORE, 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.24[21 (1985).
232. McAnany, supra note 131, at 21.
233. "Rehabilitation" is defined as, "Investing or clothing again with some right,
authority, or dignity. Restoring to a former capacity; reinstating; qualifying again."
Black's Law Dictionary 1157 (5th ed. 1979).
234. McAnany, supra note 131, at 21.
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measure of revenge because his needs are met by the offender, and
the offender can regain a sense of self-respect through rehabilitation.2 "5
The dual offender and victim oriented purpose of the VWPA is
the stepping stone from which "offense" and "victim" can be defined
to provide a just federal restitution statute. "Offense" must be defined
in a succinct manner in order to effectuate the goals of the VWPA
without violating due process. The indefiniteness of the VWPA has
already led to constitutional challenges,"' and further challenges are
likely to ensue. In order to withstand further constitutional challenges,
the term "offense" in the VWPA must be construed to mean the "of-
fense of conviction." To allow any other interpretation invites due
process challenges under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.237 Due
process requires that the offender have notice and the opportunity
to be heard. ' If the offender is ordered to make restitution for of-
fenses for which his guilt was not adjudicated, his constitutional right
of due process has been violated. Although the standard of due pro-
cess required at sentencing may be less than during a criminal trial,239
courts must distinguish the offender's opportunity to contest the ex-
tent of injury from his ability to contest the fact of injury. " Due pro-
235. This conclusion does not ignore the difficulties with the actual collection
of restitution. The offender must first be apprehended, charged with, and convicted
of an offense before restitution can be ordered. Even after restitution is ordered, the
offender's ability to pay must be taken into consideration. As indicated supra note
125 and accompanying text, restitution may not be the best program to return the
victim to his pre-crime status. However, this note focuses on the problems of the VWPA
in an attempt to aid in the VWPA's most advantageous implementation.
236. See supra notes 84-123. The definition of "offense" was first challenged
in Richard v. United States, 738 F.2d 1120 (1984). In Richard, the defendant was con-
victed of armed bank robbery. After stealing approximately $113,000, the defendant
hid the money in a men's room in a nearby university building. The police later found
the money and returned it to the bank. However, a bank audit revealed that almost
$13,000 was still missing. The defendant argued that he should not have to make restitu-
tion in that amount, because it had never been proved that he had the missing money.
The court ruled that the money was missing as a result of his offense, therefore, restitu-
tion was proper. Richard, 738 F.2d at 1120-23. In this case, the offender had been
convicted of bank robbery. Therefore the "offense of conviction" standard was not at
issue. Yet, this is the first challenge to the interpretation of "offense" in the VWPA.
237. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of due
process issues as applied to the VWPA.
238. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
239. United States v. Stephens, 699 F.2d 534, 537 (11th Cir. 1983). See also Note,
Where Offenders Pay .for Their Crimes-Victim Restitution and its Constitutionality,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685, 714-15 (1984).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
- U.S. .. 105 S. Ct. 599, 83 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1984) (where the court states, "The
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cess at sentencing does exist.2 1 To be fair to the offender, the "of-
fense of conviction" standard must be adopted by the VWPA.
Furthermore, the admissions exception to the "offense of con-
viction" rule must be strictly limited so that due process rights are
not infringed upon."2 Admissions that are not part of the prosecution
stage should be disallowed. If the offender admits restitutionary liabi-
lity without the benefit of a plea bargaining situation, his admission
may be one of criminal liability as well. If an admission of restitu-
tionary liability is not strictly enforced, and the admission becomes
one of criminal liability, the offender will likely refrain from such ad-
missions. This result defeats the VWPA's goal of reimbursing the vic-
tim to the greatest extent possible.
The VWPA should be amended so that it clearly states an "of-
fense of conviction" standard. This standard, as used in the Federal
Probation Act, has withstood numerous constitutional challenges 43 and
at the same time provides some flexibility stemming from a strictly
enforced admissions exception.
Because the necessary restriction to the "offense of conviction"
standard limits the victim-oriented goals of the VWPA, " the defini-
tion of "victim" should be given a broad interpretation. A broad in-
terpretation of "victim" will enable more victims to receive restitution
from losses they have suffered. A broad interpretation of "victim"
will also further the correctional goals4. of restitution because it helps
the offender realize the far reach of his criminal actions. Unfortunately,
the vague language of the VWPA does not adequately reflect who
should receive restitution under any interpretation of "victim";4 6 thus,
clarification is needed.
The VWPA should be amended to clearly include family
members, insurers, and other compensators of the victim as "victims"
themselves. Family members of the victim should receive restitution
fundamental and obvious difference [between restitution and civil judgment] is that
restitution occurs only after an adjudication of guilt."); United States v. Satterfield,
743 F.2d 827, 840 (11th Cir. 1984) (due process "assures the defendant he will be given
adequate notice and an opportunity to contest the facts relied upon to support his
criminal penalty.").
241. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (due process is re-
quired at sentencing as well as at the trial).
242. See supra notes 238-241. See also notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 237-242 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 128-138 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
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when the offense is homicide, when the family must provide for care
of the victim, and when the family members have a legal obligation
through their relationship to the victim to absorb the victim's financial
loss.247 Insurers and others who compensate the victim should be con-
sidered victims when they are legally bound to compensate the vic-
tim. At the very least, victims who have been compensated by in-
surers and others should be required to reimburse the compensator
upon receiving restitution.48 Classification as "victims" will enable
family members, insurers, and other compensators to receive restitu-
tion on an equal footing with the other victims.
The VWPA should also be amended to include the federal govern-
ment and charities as "victims" in certain circumstances. The govern-
ment should be considered a "victim" when it is the target of a crime
and when a government agency is legally obligated to compensate
the victim. The government should receive restitution for investigation
and prosecution expenses only when all of the other victims have
received restitution."9 Charities should be eligible for restitution when
corporate offenders have no easily ascertainable victims, but charities
should not be granted restitution when a corporate competitor is
shown to have suffered a direct and quantifiable loss." By including
the government and charities as "victims" in certain situations, the
general public benefits and the offender is forced to realize that his
actions are not limited in their effect.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress was well-intentioned in its desire to aid the victims
of crime by the passage of the VWPA. However, to implement the
VWPA fairly and effectively, sentencing judges must carefully balance
the needs of both the offender and the victim. Correctional benefits
to the offender must be emphasized because of the limited success
of restitution programs that concentrate solely on the victims' needs.
To effectuate a balanced restitution program, concise definitions of
the terms "victim" and "offense" are also needed. The definition of
"offense" must be limited to the "offense of conviction" standard to
protect the due process rights of the offender. The rights of the vic-
tim can be protected by construing the term "victim" to include the
greatest class of victims possible who have suffered as a result of
247. See text accompanying notes 201-204.
248. See supra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 220-226 and accompanying text.
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the offense for which the offender was convicted. By limiting the defini-
tion of "offense" and by expanding the definition of "victim," the
VWPA can operate effectively to best serve the needs of all partici-
pants in the criminal justice system.
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